They called it a “human robot.” Then they asked it for assault tactics.
In a hotel room in north-east Nigeria, a researcher turns the laptop around. On screen: a chatbot. The former commander nods. Yes. That is one they used. A lot.
57 interviews with 27 former Boko Haram members. The first on-the-ground dossier of frontier AI institutionalised for combat, beyond propaganda. Cambridge CASP, 2026.
You type in the question, or use your voice, and it gives you a detailed answer, like ‘How can I build a bomb?’, and then it tells you how. It is like a human robot. We used it a lot.
Former ISWAP commander · 2025 · the report’s opening
How AI entered
Three accounts on use, source and trust. Training came from outside; one line below.
We mostly used it in three ways: the first one is to learn how to assemble and use guns and how to manufacture bombs. The second one is for surveillance, like how to improve our surveillance strategies to monitor what is happening in our camps and also to better understand our enemy and prepare attacks. The third one is to make plans, like, when we come up with new ideas on how to attack, we ask it for tactics on how to make it work in practice to be successful.Former ISWAP munzir · 2025The real source is ISIS.Former ISWAP munzir · 2026There is nothing we haven’t received an answer on; we believe it knows everything.Former ISWAP commander · 2026
Training came through transnational jihadist networks: trainers called \'the white guys,\' Arabs from Afghanistan and Iraq, one instructor schooled in Russia. ISIS, named as the source.
These groups already improvised: repairing downed drones, getting captured vehicles running. AI landed on a culture that already solved things on the fly.
Organisation
A projector. Battalions sending their “top people.” Subscriptions paid from Sudan. Then the flow from trainers to the field.
There is a specific unit in Sambisa that is dedicated to AI. They don’t go to war. Their role is to disseminate information on how to use AI. They are training the people in the hierarchy. […] There are 23 in the unit. They have a special room that is powered with solar. The unit sits directly under the leadership. […] They come and gather people around a laptop. They type and then show them step-by-step how to ask questions.Former JAS commander · 2026We are not allowed to access the computers. […] but we present the problem to them to ask the AI. I don’t think there is a problem that these people cannot overcome. They are the masters. They do the analysis with the AI and give us the strategies to implement.Former ISWAP naqib · 2026We have people in different places who set up accounts that can’t be linked to us. They also pay for the subscriptions. When we need anything, these people pay for us. We have leaders in Sudan and all over who do the subscriptions for us.Former ISWAP war strategist · 2026ISWAP theological talk: how to “Islamize” ChatGPT rather than let the model modernise them.
Trainer visits; earliest exposure reported by those who left early.
Core of the accounts: units, hierarchy, routine. Most interviews cover this year.
One participant can speak into mid-2025. Models and filters have moved since.
Mission cycle
Select a cell. The panel shows the short quote and evidence tag. No recipes.
When a sophisticated weapon was seized, leaders took it to a room and typed the number. Model, loading, servicing: from the answer.
When we managed to seize a sophisticated weapon, the leaders took it to a room where they typed in the number of the weapon. It [AI] then tells you what model it is, how it will be loaded, used, and serviced.
Former JAS technical specialist · 2025
The cost
The army dug trenches. The wave of motorcycles fell into them. An ISWAP munzir tells what came next.
We saw in a movie how motorcycles can jump over bridges. We used AI to learn how to do this. We gave it information, like what motorcycles we use and the distance we need to jump and so on and it gave us steps on what we have to do. We practiced a lot and kept asking questions. We dug holes and filled them with broken glass and fire to practice. 18 of us died in the process. Eight of us managed to do it. The next time we attacked, we could jump.
Former ISWAP munzir · 2025 · full quote
We used to rely on our traditional methods. We sent 200 fighters because we had a lot of strength, but then 60 got killed. With the help of AI, we learned that it sometimes makes sense to only send 20. We learned more about well-coordinated attacks and deployment of smaller units.Former ISWAP fighter / bodyguard · 2026
Many die in the process, but that means that whatever we are trying is working!Former explosives expert · 2025 · his sister died; he was severely burnedSo many times, the [AI] unit said, ‘No, don’t do that!’Former ISWAP commander · 2026 · warnings that, he says, reduced deaths in experimentsI went to the qaid to type a question about different ways to manufacture bombs. He said he could only get the answer if he knew exactly what the problem was. […] ChatGPT gave some explanations but they were not very clear. He contacted some people about how to put the question, and then it gave us useful information […] I don’t know what he typed that made it work. They call people in the network for this kind of help every day.Former ISWAP munzir · 2026 · prompting as a craftThe rest is in the CASP report ↗. First-hand testimony.
Safeguards
That is what bypass sounds like, in their words.
My boys that have received extensive training […] then bypass the restrictions. They say they need it for a movie or something like that. […] When you start asking something sensitive, it knows that you want to use the information for something different, and we know that it knows.
Former JAS commander · 2026
Hersman and Nelson (2026), cited by Juelich: a safety system fixed on the next catastrophic scenario can leave the door wide open to other forms of terror: the conventional, iterative register this dossier documents.
What holds across witnesses
PATTERN = multi-source pattern in the report; ACCOUNT = attributed testimony; CONTEXT = secondary literature the author cites.
Both factions (ISWAP and JAS) used frontier AI for planning, weapons work and operational security, beyond online propaganda.
Access is hierarchical. Dedicated units, separate laptops, paid accounts. The qaid is usually the last rank with regular prompting rights.
Training came through transnational jihadist networks: trainers called 'the white guys, ' ISIS explicitly named as the source.
Safeguards were worked around in practice (“movie” pretext, trainer help). A refusal on one platform does not stop an organisation with accounts on several.
Analysis built on Telegram chats and propaganda tends to understate adoption: the use cases with the largest operational pay-off are exactly those groups have reason to hide.
A specialised research-and-development unit is a known factor in successful innovation by violent non-state actors (Ackerman 2016). Here the AI units sit in that organisational slot.
Literature
Only sources the report names.
Houser and Dong (2025) conclude that the terrorism-and-AI literature rests on speculative argument; the absence of empirical research is its main weakness. This study is a field answer.
Houser & Dong 2025Ackerman (2016): for violent non-state innovation, stable members who reconfigure existing methods matter more than isolated geniuses. A separate R&D unit is a success factor: here, the AI units.
Ackerman 2016Samuel (2025): in 2024 ISIS sent instructors to ISWAP (drones, VBIEDs, hacking, tactics). AI training sits in the same knowledge-transfer package.
Samuel 2025Juelich: conclusions from public chats and propaganda risk systematic underestimation. The applications with the largest advantage are those the group has strongest reason to hide.
Juelich 2026 · Observationsal-Barnawi asked ISIS for a framework for the army, explosives, artillery: “the most chaotic sector.” The 2017 needs list overlaps the LLM use cases in the interviews.
al-Barnawi 2017 · Hamming 2023“We are in danger of creating a safety system that fixates on guarding against the next pandemic while leaving the door wide open to other forms of terror.” (Hersman & Nelson 2026)
Hersman & Nelson 2026Glossary
Limits
Testimony from mid-rank defectors, self-reported. No documented CBRN programme. 'Uplift' stays a testimony-level perception, beyond any lab measurement. Even so, adoption looks more systematic than the Telegram chats suggested: that is why it's worth reading in full.
Sources